

Social Dynamics in Tikrit and al-Alam for Early Recovery Programming

ASSESSMENT FOR QADISSIYA
QUARTER, TAL AL-SEEBAT, AL-AHAD,
SAMAD, AND ERBAIDHA

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report reflects findings from fieldwork conducted in Tikrit Centre and al-Alam in Salahaddin Governorate over late October 2017. This research, carried out by Social Inquiry in collaboration with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), served to help in guiding the approach and implementation of early recovery programming in these areas and focused particularly on improving social cohesion. The need for this programming and analysis is evident given Tikrit and al-Alam's significance as a centre of power under the Baath regime and its reversal of fortune in aftermath of the Iraq War, including the arrival of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) into the area in 2014. Since Tikrit and al-Alam's recapture from the armed group by Iraqi Security Forces in 2015, the neighbourhoods and villages within these subdistricts have seen a high return of their previously displaced populations as well as hosting a significant population of families still displaced from Hawija and other parts of Salahaddin Governorate. The growing interplay between past, current, and emerging dynamics makes it critical to gain an understanding of how ordinary people, both returnees and those displaced, living in these areas feel about their current situation ahead of implementing large-scale early recovery programming focussed on community-driven approaches to resilience and livelihoods; governance and service delivery; social cohesion; and protection.

A qualitative approach was taken to capture more nuanced information regarding community perceptions with a specific semi-structured questionnaire developed covering the following topics: *local social dynamics* (location characteristics, events and changes since 2014, interactions within and between groups, perceptions on security and rule of law), *local conflict and peace mechanisms* (changes in context and personal life/living conditions since 2003, experience of past disputes or tensions, potential new and old sources of local tensions after ISIS, existing indigenous problem-solving and mediation mechanisms), and *communal dynamics* (personal identity within the broader group history; sense of belonging to group and location; preferred solutions and priorities to improve feelings of belonging, comfort, and security). Questions also sought to capture information regarding specific indicators selected from existing fragility and social cohesion framework developed by Social Inquiry as well (e.g., likelihood of revenge, adequacy of actors providing security, trust in formal institutions to resolve disputes, community disenfranchisement, etc.). The questions were discussed and further refined in conjunction with the DRC Early Recovery team in Tikrit. A total of 34 interviews were conducted (10 in al-Qadissiya 2, 6 in Tal al-Seebat, 10 in Erbaidha, 4 in al-Ahad, 4 in Samad), with a 50-50 gender balance.

Overall findings in relation to composition, movement, and dynamics of the target locations are as follows:

- The bulk of the host population in Tikrit Centre and al-Alam have returned over the last two years. Most of these families had displaced to Hawija and Kirkuk Centre. According to assessment respondents, those still not back are awaiting better service provision in these areas or their houses are destroyed. Others are allegedly ISIS affiliated and are said to not be allowed to return.
- The impact of the conflict on the socio-economic fabric on these areas has been extremely large, with job opportunities still scarce and steady income limited. Security is seen as slowly improving and services are back to the same precarious pre-2014 levels.

- Those displaced within Tikrit Centre and al-Alam primarily originally from within Salahaddin Governorate are returning to their places of origin. The bulk of those still displaced here are from Hawija, as this area was only recently retaken from ISIS.

Furthermore, while each target location has its own particularities in relation to interactions, populations living therein, and service and protection views, the following cross-cutting themes emerged across locations, with particularly interesting differences based on gender:

- **Bringing People Together** – Overall, respondents across locations and residence statuses reported strong feelings of belonging to Iraq as a nation. Host community respondents indicated close attachment to their current subdistrict while displaced individuals felt very loose connection to their current location. This tracks well with responses from individuals from Hawija who felt particularly unwelcome in their current locations in part because of their interactions with the host community who make clear they are unwanted and should return to their places of origin. Exploring belonging in more detail also uncovered community distinction between old and new host community members to the chagrin of those who came to Tikrit in the period between 2006 and 2010. Women host community members in particular felt loose belonging to their home subdistricts, and instead wished to live in more modern, less tribal environments allowing more opportunities for themselves and their children. Respondents also indicate the need to focus on youth to provide guidance and opportunity for them to advance their lives. Clouding over the sense of belonging, is the fear, particularly among women, both host and displaced, of the return of allegedly ISIS-affiliated families. This has impacted women’s perceptions of trust within their communities since 2014, while men report ties are stronger now that people know who is who in relation to ISIS affiliation.
- **Perceived Threats** – The protection concerns highlighted by host community members included the fear of a return or re-emergence of ISIS as well as concern of being neglected and unable to provide for their families. This broke down by gender, with women focused on the former and men on the latter. Displaced respondents noted particular fear in being forced to return, either by authorities not renewing residence permits or by host community kicking them out. Related to this, they also feared evictions given the rising cost of rents in the area, again potential as a means to get them to return to their places of origin prematurely. Finally, displaced families reported concern with collective blame as some of their tribes had sided with ISIS in the conflict. The risk in all of this is premature returns, which could lead to further secondary displacement. Overall, particularly among men, is the fear of neglect and unemployment. This concern showed itself again across groups and gender in relation to aid distribution and reconstruction, where people seemed unclear how NGOs decided on families to help and areas to target. These perceived threats were exacerbated by people’s feelings that everyone seemed more selfish, only concerned with their immediate families and not helping the wider community of friends, relatives, and neighbours. Perhaps linked to this is anxiety regarding the changing and unpredictable social landscape, particularly in these tribal areas where extended families who once lived together are now displaced across the country.
- **Responsiveness (or Lack Thereof)** – Nearly all respondents indicated a generalized mistrust of, if not outright rejection toward, authorities at both the provincial and local levels. Perceived channels for advocacy to authorities in relation to community needs was deemed either non-existent or unresponsive. This may also help to explain the perception of aid as being unfairly

distributed, with people not understanding how or why some receive help and others do not. Finally, in relation to conflict resolution mechanisms, in general, people preferred going through tribal leaders ahead of the police for smaller community-related issues. The opposite held true in more urban areas.

Given the above findings, some considerations that may be important for DRC to take into account when implementing early recovery programming and other longer-term development projects are below. These issues represent recommendations that can be used to maximise the positive impact and sustainability of such work to further build positive, community-led change:

- Community development committees (CDCs) need to serve as a link between communities and institutions, providing quick response. Establishing a connection between CDCs and local authorities seems critical in this context in order to (re)build trust in institutions among the communities. This trust has deteriorated since 2003 and is particularly low now. Institutions and local authorities are worryingly absent from the people's minds as being a useful resort to achieve improved wellbeing. People also overwhelmingly indicate that avenues for advocacy or even being heard by authorities is limited and not effective. CDCs can play serve as a conduit for advocacy between their communities and respective local authorities in order to prevent further neglect of these communities – especially in this context when authorities are gradually stepping up their capacity back to pre-2014 levels. This advocacy can help in keeping pressure on local authorities to deliver as well as being transparent with their constituents on what is possible and why. It will be critical for local authorities as well as the CDCs to engage, act as quickly as possible, and be accountable to their communities in order to help this shift in perspective.
- **Civic-oriented activities for youth.** There is a legitimate concern for the youth in Tikrit, in particular because of years of conflict, displacement and economic downturn – concern especially present in urban areas such as Qadissiya. For this reason, it would be remiss to not work to specifically target this population group across genders and residence status not only for civic engagement and learning, but outlets for fun and recreation as well. These are two different though not mutually exclusive sets of activities that would allow young people, across groups, to have space to interact, discuss issues of importance to them, plan events or activities, and develop ways to promote positive change in their communities. This can include engagement within the CDC or presentation to the body as needed. Critical here is also space for young people to relax and enjoy themselves outside the confines of more rigid family or tribal structures and difficult life circumstances, post-ISIS.
- **Opportunities for women.** A substantial sample of the host community women within this study indicated that they would prefer to live outside of their communities, in places with more freedom and opportunity available to them. This highlights a willingness of women to more actively participate in their communities and outside of their homes, if there is an appropriate space to do so. It also provides an opportunity to begin discussions on changing gender norms within these communities. One avenue to start exploring this greater desire for agency is in providing literacy and numeracy courses to those who need it (the bulk of the women respondents in this survey had only primary education). Women also expressed interest in starting small businesses or receiving support for the work they currently do – interventions in this regard should not necessarily target the most vulnerable per se, but those who have a higher likelihood of being successful to serve as a model for others seeking similar endeavours. Beyond this, again as with youth, allowing women across groups

to interact and perhaps develop platforms for their own advocacy may also help in allowing them more visible participation within community affairs. For every effort to engage women however, attention must also be paid to men in working with them to change views of gender roles as well.

- **Protection oriented programming around forced returns.** It may be positive to pay attention to protection needs of IDPs facing risk of forced or premature returns to their places of origin. With likelihood of evictions and pressure to move at such relatively high levels, referral mechanisms within the community may be needed so that such cases can be managed through other DRC units or other partner NGOs.
- **Utilize appropriate speakers / messenger for community outreach.** Given the tight hierarchical structure of most target communities, key people within them can support the program in terms of helping generate buy-in and participation of all population groups residing in these areas. This is particularly critical as not everyone was aware of any programming taking place and many had varying views of the role of NGOs within their communities and the fairness of whatever aid has already been provided. Clear communication of what programming will take place, who can benefit, and why is necessary. Tribal leaders, imams and community members working in public institutions (e.g., doctors, teachers, etc.), are key assets for community outreach.
- **CDC as community contact point for NGOs.** In building the impartiality and functioning of the CDCs, they can start becoming a point of contact in these location and an entry point for NGOs who seek to work in these areas. This may help in minimising inefficiency and duplication in work as well as better tailoring programming to community needs.
- **Synergies with peacebuilding actors.** The data presented here indicates a number of potential ruptures in the social fabric within Tikrit: between host communities and the displaced, within host community depending on place of origin and perceived ISIS affiliation, and among those still displaced but hoping to return. These issues run deep and may be outside the scope of early recovery programming per se, but will likely need to be engaged with to ensure social cohesion programming that is conflict sensitive and inclusive. Thus, engaging with peacebuilding actors who have skill in safe facilitation and programming already working on these issues within the governorate is essential. In addition, it would be of use to connect the CDCs who are working at the very local level to emerging peacebuilding architecture, forming at the district and governorate levels in relation to issues on accountability, returns, security, and service provision to help in connecting local level concerns to wider governorate level policies and action and vice versa. These connections could help in boosting the sustainability of the CDCs, making sure community concerns are raised to the appropriate authorities.

1. BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

Tikrit Centre, and surrounding rural subdistrict, al-Alam, within Salahaddin Governorate, hold a particularly prominent place in modern Iraqi history and mythology, given that it is the birthplace of Saddam Hussein and a centre of his Baathist regime. What this meant for the heavily tribal, majority Sunni Arab inhabitants was a priority of place in the government, particularly in security posts, and with this an accumulation of wealth and influence, second only to Baghdad. The area and its inhabitants also provided the status quo for the previous regime's efforts to impose a single Iraqi national identity, from a predominantly Arab identity during the Iran-Iraq War, an Islamic identity during the Gulf Crisis and its aftermath, and finally a Tribal identity in what became the waning years of the regime, to consolidate power and staunch dissent.¹ Given all of this, and the fact that only those originally from Tikrit could live in the area during this time, the notion that "Tikrit is not a welcoming city," was prevalent.²

The factors that made the area stand out in influence under the previous regime are the same ones that led to its reversal of fortune in the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003. A significant proportion of households in Salahaddin as a whole, and in Tikrit and al-Alam in particular, were heavily impacted by the ensuing de-Baathification process which purged those associated with the Baath party from their posts, including in government and security forces, limiting income sources for many and seen as a vengeful policy by those affected.³ The governorate has since largely been neglected in terms of new investment and services as well.⁴

Furthermore, as in the rest of Iraq's Sunni-majority areas after 2003, it suffered from a lack of clear leadership to advocate for the needs of the governorate in Baghdad and because of this, new grievances toward the new Shia-dominated central government developed. Out of this morass of decline in social status and perception of new marginalization and punishment of Sunni Arabs, emerged extreme violence including the bombing of Shia shrines in neighbouring Samarra district and two years (2006-2008) of sectarian warfare, particularly impacting Salahaddin as a site for anti-government and extremist armed groups, targeting the area's inhabitants. In addition, this identity-based conflict also unleashed a wave of displacement into Tikrit and part of al-Alam with, for the first time, predominantly Sunni Arabs from outside of the subdistricts and governorate moving in, fleeing violence from elsewhere in the country, including Baghdad.⁵ Finally, the regime change of 2003 also sparked tribal tensions within the governorate among already heavily armed groups. The shift in positions of power from those tribes linked to Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime, including those in al-Alam, to the Jabouri laid additional divisions for the ISIS to manipulate when it stormed through in 2014.

Needless to say then from the above and as depicted in Table 1, Tikrit Centre and al-Alam were far from idyllic across a number of vectors before the arrival of ISIS. Indeed, a recent study of the governorate

¹ Adeed Dawisha, "Identity and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq," *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 4 (1999), 553-567.

² Danish Refugee Council Early Recovery Program staff discussion, Tikrit Office, October 23, 2017.

³ See, Miranda Sisson and Abdulrazzaq Al-Saiedi, *A Bitter Legacy: Lessons of De-Baathification in Iraq*, International Center for Transitional Justice: New York, 2013; and Hazeem Saghieh, "The Life and Death of De-Baathification," *Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée* 117-118 (2007), 203-223.

⁴ Sanad for Peacebuilding, *Conflict Dynamics in Salahaddin Governorate*, Sanad: Baghdad, 2017.

⁵ Danish Refugee Council Early Recovery Program staff discussion, Tikrit Office, October 23, 2017.

found that 90% of people interviewed across Salahaddin felt that the conflict in the region was an outcome of the deterioration of economic opportunities and the lack of good governance since 2003.⁶

Table 1. A snapshot of fragility right before ISIS

	Tikrit Centre	al-Alam	Salahaddin	Iraq
% of households below the Iraqi national poverty line	15%	15%	17%	20%
% of male population between age 16-29 that is unemployed or underemployment, but searching for work	31%	10%	18%	26%
% of people born between 1960 and 1990 with no education certificate	15%	3%	18%	30%
Ratio of individuals working on public services (education, health, waste collection) per 100 inhabitants	1%	4%	2%	2%
% of heads of households, or wives/husbands, that were born in a different Iraqi governorate or country	21%	9%	17%	11%
% of respondents that agree or strongly agree that corruption is more extensive now than two years ago (district level only)	80%	80%	65%	53%
% of adult individuals that express being unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with the level of local security	21%	13%	23%	10%
% of adult individuals that expressed being unsatisfied or not at all satisfied with the trust/acceptance felt in the community/neighborhood	10%	8%	8%	10%
% of respondents that had either contacted a politician, attended a political discussion or attended a demonstration (or would have done it), as opposed to those that would never do such action	17%	17%	38%	48%
Confidence score (from 0 = no confidence to 10 = full confidence) given to the Government of Iraq, to local government village/town, and to tribal leaders (average of the three) (district level only)	4.8	4.8	5.1	6.5

Note: data was originally sourced from the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey (IHSES, 2012) and the Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN, 2011).

This fragile situation benefited ISIS militants, easing their takeover of the governorate in 2014 – with Al-Alam being the last area to fall within Tikrit due to resistance from the population. Marginalized tribes from the post-2003 era played a significant role in supporting the ensuing insurgency as a consequence. New disputes between tribes emerged because of the ISIS takeover, especially and with even greater intensity after the Speicher massacre near Tikrit in 2014, where 1,700 army recruits (mostly, but not exclusively, Shia from other parts of Iraq) were captured and executed when trying to escape from the military base.⁷ The massacre has been attributed to some of the tribes living in the area accused of siding with ISIS. This also made the retaking of predominantly Sunni Arab Tikrit and al-Alam from ISIS in general fraught given the confluence of both Sunni and Shia security actors, including the Iraqi Army, Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and tribal militias.⁸ Human rights violations against civilians and

⁶ Simone Carter and Luisa Dietrich, *Summary Report: Multi Sectorial Needs Assessment with Gender and Protection Analysis*, Oxfam Iraq: Erbil, 2017.

⁷ Sanad, *Conflict Dynamics*.

⁸ Erica Gaston and Frauke Maas, *Iraq After ISIL: Tikrit and Surrounding Areas*, Global Public Policy Institute: Berlin, 2017.

destruction of civilian infrastructure was reported during ISIS occupation as well as during and after military operations.⁹

Tikrit Centre and al-Alam faced large-scale mass displacement on the arrival of ISIS as well as during the military operations to retake these areas from ISIS, with nearly everyone living there being displaced at some point during this 2014-2015 period; the majority fleeing for their lives.¹⁰ They most often displaced into Hawija and Kirkuk Centre. Despite somewhat regular asymmetrical ISIS attacks on security forces in the area since its retaking, Tikrit and al-Alam have also seen relatively high rates of population return, particularly since 2016. Those still not back are reportedly displaced because their houses are destroyed, are waiting for better security and service conditions, or are allegedly ISIS-affiliated.¹¹ (It should be noted that a detention camp for alleged ISIS-affiliated families is located on the outskirts of Tikrit.¹²) In addition, Tikrit Centre and al-Alam also host a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), predominantly from Hawija as well as those from Beiji and al-Shirqat within Salahaddin. Many of these IDPs are also starting to return to their places of origin.

Despite the fact that people are returning, post-2014 conflict governance within the provincial council and governorship faces factional and family disputes linked to coming 2018 elections, rendering any governmental action ineffective and/or blocked. The current chaotic situation means that the administration in Tikrit is unable to fully provide stability and services to the general population and cannot fully take responsibility of security or returns process.¹³ This lack of provision was noted in a recent assessment in Salahaddin where respondents noted that electricity and clean water supply were particularly weak and availability of jobs and health services was low. Of the 25% of respondents who were unable to pay for basic needs (i.e., food, water, shelter, hygiene, and urgent medical care), two thirds were from villages within al-Alam and the remaining one third were in the Qadissiya neighbourhood of Tikrit.¹⁴

Given the fluidity of the current situation in the aftermath of ISIS in Salahaddin Governorate, particularly in Tikrit Centre and al-Alam, and the growing interplay between past, current, and emerging dynamics, it is critical to gain an understanding of how ordinary people, both returnees and IDPs, living in these areas feel about their current situation ahead of implementing large-scale early recovery programming focussed on community-driven approaches to resilience and livelihoods; governance and service delivery; social cohesion; and protection. This in part will be facilitated by the formation of Community Development Committees (CDCs) in each target location.

As such, Social Inquiry, in coordination with DRC carried out a social cohesion and dynamics qualitative profiling to provide deeper and more nuanced analysis of target communities for sustainable and conflict sensitive implementation.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., Danish Refugee Council, *Multisector Needs Assessment: Anbar, Diyala, Salah-al-Din*, DRC: Baghdad, 2017.

¹¹ International Organization for Migration, *Obstacles to Return in Retaken Areas of Iraq*, IOM Iraq: Baghdad, 2017.

¹² Human Rights Watch, *Iraq: Displacement, Detention of Suspected "ISIS Families"*, HRW: Erbil, March 5, 2017.

¹³ Ghazawan Hassan al-Jibouri, "Power, Money and Angry Cousins: Political In-Fighting in Salahaddin Province Causing Municipal Chaos," *Niqash*, March 17, 2016.

¹⁴ DRC, *Multisector Needs Assessment*.

2. METHODOLOGY


A qualitative approach was taken for the research, based on a series of semi-structured interviews to residents in the targeted neighbourhoods and villages within Tikrit Centre and al-Alam, respectively. To develop a baseline of social cohesion to guide early recovery programming and implementation, it is necessary to gather a very nuanced representation of past, current and future dynamics. This is less likely to be accurately captured through quantitative indicators and close-ended questions. Based on experience carrying out research in this context, people tend to speak in stories and idioms and taking them solely at face value yields impartial insights. At this moment, in addition, people seem to be more open to answer what is assumed to be “sensitive” questions, depending on how they are framed and if they are allowed to speak at their convenience.

A specific semi-structured questionnaire was developed for the assessment, covering the following topics: *local social dynamics* (location characteristics, events and changes since 2014, interactions within and between groups, perceptions on security and rule of law), *local conflict and peace mechanisms* (changes in context and personal life/living conditions since 2003, experience of past disputes or tensions, potential new and old sources of local tensions after ISIS, existing indigenous problem-solving and mediation mechanisms), and *communal dynamics* (personal identity within the broader group history; sense of belonging to group and location; preferred solutions and priorities to improve feelings of belonging, comfort, and security). Questions also sought to capture information regarding specific indicators selected from existing fragility and social cohesion framework developed by Social Inquiry as well (e.g., likelihood of revenge, adequacy of actors providing security, trust in formal institutions to resolve disputes, community disenfranchisement, etc.). The questions were discussed and further refined in conjunction with the DRC Early Recovery team in Tikrit.

The target locations for the assessment were based on areas where DRC has planned its programming (Figure 1), taking into account the following categories of residents present in each, as appropriate: old host community (those residents who have always lived in Tikrit or al-Alam); new host community (those residents who came to Tikrit or al-Alam generally between 2003 and 2009 from elsewhere in Iraq); and IDPs (those displaced due to the ISIS-conflict, namely from Hawija, al-Shirqat, and Beiji districts).

A total of 34 interviews were conducted (10 in al-Qadissiya 2, 6 in Tal al-Seebat, 10 in Erbaidha, 4 in al-Ahad, 4 in Samad). Because of the ethno-religious homogeneity (Sunni Arab) across locations and among resident categories but heterogeneity in relation to tribal and clan affiliation, the sampling strategy aimed to gather insights from different tribes residing in these locations. Sampling also took into account other social segments such as age (below or above 35 years old), occupation (member of security forces, farmer, civil servant, business owner, unemployed, student, retired, mukhtar or sheikh), education level (no education, basic education, high school or above), and gender as well. To this last point, a 50-50 gender balance was reached with 17 interviews carried out with women across locations, and 17 with men.

Figure 1. Geographical scope of the interviews



34 QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS

Tel al Seebat

- 2 women host community
- 1 woman IDP Hawija
- 1 man host community
- 2 men IDP Hawija

Erbaidha

- 2 women host community
- 2 women IDP Salahaddin
- 1 woman IDP Hawija
- 4 men host community
- 1 man IDP Hawija

Al-Ahad + Samad

- 1 woman host community (old)
- 1 woman host community (new)
- 2 women IDP Hawija
- 2 men host community (old)
- 1 man host community (new)
- 1 man IDP Hawija

Qadissiya

- 2 women host community (old)
- 1 woman host community (new)
- 2 women IDP Salahaddin
- 1 man host community (old)
- 2 men host community (new)
- 2 men IDP Salahaddin

Interview data was collected by Social Inquiry researchers, working in pairs. In many cases, there was more than one person present in the interviews and these people also contributed to answering the questions –it was often the case that relatives and neighbours gathered around out of curiosity. While this was not an ideal research situation, it was socially and culturally inappropriate to exclude these other participants from contributing to the conversation. This did serve, however, to verify responses within and between villages and neighbourhoods targeted.

3. POPULATION COMPOSITION, MOVEMENT AND DYNAMICS

The following section provides a description of the population and current situation in this area, and for each of the villages assessed in particular, based on the insights gathered from the interviews conducted in these locations as well as with the DRC staff. It focuses on both the historical and demographic context the population, as well as the particular responses of the interviewees on needs and expectations. These are brief snapshots of each location which will be further developed in subsequent sections.

3.1. Composition, movement and dynamics

HOST COMMUNITY DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN

- The vast majority of the pre-2014 inhabitants of these areas have returned to their previous residences during the last 2 years, when the return process started in Tikrit district. Most of the residents sought refuge in Hawija Centre (especially those from the most rural areas) or in Kirkuk Centre either in the aftermath of ISIS arrival or during military operations.
- Those who have not yet returned are those whose houses remain destroyed or who prefer to wait until services improve. The figure of population still displaced is, however, relatively limited according to interviewees. An additional element refers to some families being displaced due to alleged ISIS affiliation and who are not expected back or considered part of the community anymore.

CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION DUE TO THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT

- During the period immediately before the emergence of ISIS, the area was generally described as middle class. Respondents pointed to sources of income being available, both in the public sector and private sector (e.g., small business owners or wage earners). A large number of families had members within security forces, being this the main employment sector. People felt the place was safe and secure, with some exceptions, *“Security used to be good in al-Alam even though the presence of al-Qaeda but, because we were fighting them, we had good protection. There was no restriction in movement but there were security concerns when going to other governorates,”* (Male host community member from Samad, 45 years old). There was significant freedom of movement through the north-south highways towards Kirkuk and Baghdad. The availability of public services was of varying quality, but relatively low especially in terms of electricity supply.
- The impact of the conflict on the socio-economic fabric has been extremely large, even two years after the area was retaken. Job opportunities are scarce, especially new government positions, and steady income is not as spread as before. As one respondent in the private sector put it, *“The economy got really bad. The main occupation now is being unemployed. I am tired – there are no jobs, no businesses,”* (Male new host community member from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 45 years old). Other respondents, still a minority, pointed to the economic situation slowly improving again, but not to previous levels. Security perceptions are improving – although there are concerns about future stability, as explained in a section below. Restrictions in freedom of movement apply across the governorate, especially for IDPs, who are reportedly being asked to proof displacement status. Finally, public services are largely restored to the same (“precarious”) level.

POST-2014 IDPS RETURNING

- During the last months, the bulk of IDPs originally from other areas of Salahaddin Governorate, such as Beiji and al-Shirqat, that were hosted in Tikrit, have already returned. Those who remain displaced in Tikrit Centre and al-Alam mentioned being unable to return in the immediate term due to their primary residence being destroyed and being a costly reconstruction process; for example, one respondent mentioned *“[My house] half of it is destroyed – in my street, only 2 houses were left standing; I am trying to renovate the house and we said to be in Tikrit until things are fixed... there*

are still ISIS bodies around,” (Male IDP from Beiji displaced to Qadissiya, 43 years old). Other reasons stated by IDPs for why they remain in Tikrit include their inability to afford the costs of returning and lack of services and security in their places of origin.

- The largest proportion of IDPs remaining are those displaced from Hawija around a year ago, when military operations in that district started. All IDPs from Hawija have endured nearly three years of life under ISIS. It is worth mentioning also that the same major tribes can be found both in Hawija and in Tikrit districts (Jabour, Obeid, Ta’y, etc.), although they often belong to different subtribes or clans. Tribal links do matter to a certain extent as many families who fled from Tikrit two years ago stayed in Hawija, and now those displaced from Hawija are staying in Tikrit. With Hawija being retaken by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and PMFs since October 2017, the IDPs now face additional pressure both by the Tikrit residents and the authorities to return to their residences – in spite of stability or reconstruction still not being achieved.
- For these reasons, the presence of IDPs is currently very dynamic in both Tikrit Centre and al-Alam: during the fieldwork period, it was relatively common to see trucks loaded with the belongings of Hawija IDP families returning to their towns. Comparing data retrieved from IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), the number of IDPs in Tikrit district in September 30 2017 was 162,000 individuals, while by 15 November 2017 the number decreased to 109,000 individuals.

3.2. Description of locations

QADISSIYA (#2)

- IOM’s DTM currently counts near 2,300 families that have returned back to this location. This large neighbourhood is a conglomerate of different tribes, being the largest the Takarta, Duleim, Obeid and Jabour. Small clusters of other ethnic groups, like Kurds and Turkmen, can be found too. The place has been hosting also large numbers of IDPs from different past episodes – there are new host community members originally from Baghdad, Diyala and other parts of Salahaddin like Samarra, as mentioned by respondents. The place *“became an attraction for IDPs because it is safe, services are available – but all was impacted because of the large arrival of people.”* (Male new host community member from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 45 years old). Interestingly, the largest number of IDPs from the ISIS conflict are originally from other areas of Salahaddin (mainly Baiji) and less from Hawija, compared to the other locations.
- Of all the locations assessed, this was the first place taken by ISIS (as with the rest of Tikrit Centre) before crossing to al-Alam. According to respondents, there was confusion in the beginning in relation to who the militants were or what they wanted. *“People did not understand the situation and were kind of happy in the beginning. But after the Speicher massacre and what the ISIS’ imam said in the mosque, I said to my family to leave. I explained to my neighbours what all this would become, because we had seen the same in Diyala.”* (Male new host community member from Diyala living in Qadissiya since 2007, 52 years old). This triggered displacement towards a diversity of places –

Kirkuk and Erbil mainly. Subsequent airstrikes and military operations to retake the city by ISF triggered then a new wave of displacement, after which most of the population quickly returned.¹⁵

- In terms of safety, the neighbourhood was facing significant issues in the past (as noted in Table 2 for the indicator on people feeling insecure). Two respondents in this study pointed to the threats for the people coming from the outside (extremist militants entering from Anbar) as well as from the inside: “*Security was not very good; there was a strong presence of al-Qaeda here . . . [but] things are stable and none of those groups that use to operate here are present. The zone seems ‘clean’.*” (Male host community member from Qadissiya, 66 years old). This situation had a significantly negative impact on cohesion and community relations in Qadissiya, according to host community respondents.
- That the neighbourhood is not predominantly tribally structured as the other locations, probably due to its more urban character, can be seen at the preferred conflict resolution actors. Host community pointed out that the preference between formal rule of law (police) or tribal rule of law (tribal leaders) depends on the case, but by default they preferred the police – leaving the tribe for petty issues. New host community members in the neighbourhood referred to the police, with one respondent pointing that a new regulation in Qadissiya specifies that the mukhtar is the person to be informed of any issue first. While this respondent showed approval of the role of the mukhtar, other respondents reacted differently: “*Mukhtar solves problems but people prefer to handle it themselves instead. People prefer to go to the police than the mukhtar . . . he will help you but only if you pay.*” (Female host community member from Qadissiya, 60 years old). Finally, IDPs pointed to three different options: going to the police, talking to neighbours, or not raising concerns anywhere.
- A widely common issue commented specifically by IDPs in Qadissiya, more than in any other place, is the threat of eviction. As one respondent said: “*My main threat is housing, because the landlord here wants us out in 2 days. I have been taking days off to move, but I cannot find any other place that is affordable. They ask too much money and my house in Beiji is not ready to return . . . Providing for my family and giving them a roof to stay are huge concerns right now.*” (Male IDP from Beiji displaced to Qadissiya, 43 years old). Other IDPs, if not actually asked to leave the house, are aware of the threat – female respondents especially feeling more housebound than usual because of concerns of not being able to come back.
- While some host community members pointed to reconstruction and better sources of income as the factors that could make this neighbourhood a comfortable place to live in, there was a common theme pointed by many and not seen in other locations: youth. There was a generalized concern regarding the future of young residents in the area beyond being immersed in apathy, especially focused on the lack of opportunities to develop their life (both in terms of employment and purpose).

TAL AL-SEEBAT

- IOM’s DTM counts nearly 530 families that have returned back to this village. Although essentially inhabited by the Obeid tribe, there are different subtribes: the largest is Albu-Ali, followed by other minor groups like Albu-Nimar, al-Sury, al-Edowi, Albu-Sayef and Albu-Sultan. The population has

¹⁵ Because of the high rate of return, in part associated to UN-funded stabilization projects, Tikrit Centre is seen as a stabilization success story. See <http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/ourwork/Stabilization/our-stories/stabilization-in-tikrit.html>

not been subject to change or upheavals in the past, with the exception of the current arrival of IDPs mainly from Hawija – members also of Obeid tribe in their majority, although from a different subtribe (mainly Albu-Hamza). Internal issues among the Obeid tribe have been mentioned by some respondents, pointing to very low community trust levels and in-fight due to fierce competition for material purposes after 2003.

- Days after ISIS took control of the village, that lasted for 1.5 years, part of the families left to Hawija if they could manage it – but came back after some months. Further displacement occurred when the ISF initiated operations in the area, again towards Hawija, until the area was deemed safe to return: *“We really suffered and handled things as ISIS made new rules. We couldn’t displace though because we didn’t want to leave our homes and we had children . . . When the Army came, we felt scared and displaced to Hawija for one month. We displaced alone without our husbands,”* (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 19 years old).
- The village has one clear tribal leader that manages issues among the population – not only of Tal al-Seebat but also of other surrounding villages part of the Obeid tribe. A widely held perception in the town is summarised in this statement by a host community respondent: *“The Sheikh has his own connections with the police, government, and checkpoints. There is no need for going to the police. The Sheikh decides how to solve and asks if it is a tribal or government issue. We prefer to do it this way and don’t feel like this needs to involve anyone else. He is the one,”* (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 38 years old). This position also extends to the IDPs, who largely see him as *“[the] biggest support here for IDPs,”* (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to Tal al-Seebat, 47 years old). It is worth noting that there has been a change in the leadership of al-Alam’s Obeid as the former tribal leader died less than a year ago and his son recently stepped into the position.
- A common theme across host community members regarding factors that could make the residents of Tal al-Seebat more comfortable and secure was regarding both availability and quality of services. Special focus was given to the need for better water supply (particularly a process to purify the direct water intake from a river polluted “by dead bodies,” as some residents put it) as well as improve basic education: *“If you go to schools, they are completely underserved and the government is not doing much; for example, teachers who are supposed to come here pay bribes to avoid having to come to this part of the district to work and we are forced to pay private teachers,”* (Male host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 50 years old). Some families mentioned having difficulties to afford paying the fees, which impacts also IDP families using host community’s system.

ERBAIDHA

- IOM’s DTM counts nearly 400 families that have returned to this village. Local tribes there are divided mainly between Obeid (mainly Albu-Ali) and Ta’y, with a very small presence of other tribes. Families are largely clustered in different parts of the town based on tribal affiliation. It currently hosts a variety of IDPs from Hawija and other parts of Salahaddin.
- The village was seized by ISIS for some days before finally entering into it. As with other places, some of the people remained and some left – including those hiding in the mountains to avoid retaliation because, as two respondents proudly mentioned, there was a significant presence of residents in the Sunni Awakening Forces who were targeted by ISIS. The impact of ISIS was felt on the population as described: *“When they took it, the services stopped, jobs disappeared, and they*

took many men that still are disappeared,” (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 34 years old). Most of the population were finally displaced when ISF operations started. Notably, in spite of the important potential presence of the Sunni Awakening, another respondent pointed to the presence of extremist militants in the town and how this affected community trust: *“There were many militants hiding around, you did not know who was ISIS and who not. Now you know who is who,”* (Male host community from Erbaidha, 41 years old).

- Local governance is broken up in many tribes and subtribes, with different local leaders and mukhtars – there is not a one go-to person. Host community respondents mentioned unanimously to prefer presenting issues before the tribal elders. IDPs had a more nuanced perspective: many of the IDPs interviewed preferred to go through the host community relatives and neighbours in general, in addition to going to the tribal system or the police – both systems mentioned.
- In a similar fashion to Tal al-Seebat, host community members pointed also to a much needed improvement of public services provision as means to make the place comfortable and safe to live in. Affordability concerns were also raised regarding access to services, mainly in reference to the newly taken decision to convert the girls’ school into a private one.
- **Duleimat village** → As part of DRC’s programming in the area, the small cluster of families living in this village is also included as part of Erbaidha. It must be noted, however, that technically these 200 families are part of Khazimiya town – not Erbaidha. This annex was built in the 70s, after some families originally from the Jazeera area in northern Salahaddin were expelled due to tribal disputes and took refuge in al-Alam. All members are from Duleim tribe. As such, they are considered as a “displaced” minority here (in spite of Duleim being a very large and relevant tribe in other parts of Iraq) – because of this condition, they have traditionally had significant impediments to access government employment or farmlands, and the usual occupation (including for the sheikh) has been always in temporary employment in construction. During ISIS takeover, families eventually left towards Baghdad and Hawija. The return process for residents in Duleimat village involved, however, concerns that required tribal involvement: *“Some families coming back from Hawija faced some security issues as some neighbouring tribes had concerns towards us, but now all has been solved and everybody is back . . . At the beginning of the return there were some tensions and we, the leaders, had to sit with the other sheikhs in the area and talk things,”* (Male host community member from Duleimat, sheikh).

SAMAD AND AL-AHAD

- IOM’s DTM counts nearly 750 families in al-Ahad and nearly 760 families in Samad that have returned to these villages. The predominant tribe in these villages is Jabour, which is also the most powerful in the subdistrict of al-Alam in particular, holding key government positions. Post-2014 IDPs are also mostly Jabour from Hawija, hosted in these villages due to tribal links – although the subtribes are different. The village of Samad in particular is also home of a significant number of families that settled there between 2003 and 2008 originally from other governorates.
- Respondents described the resistance of the villages’ populations to ISIS’s advance, “We were under siege for 16 days. We made resistance until we were left with no food and ammunition. ISIS arrested many people and the rest left in the following 4 days. We were 400 fighting here,” (Male host

community member from al-Ahad, 70 years old). Displacement lasted for nearly a year, the time that ISIS was in control of the area.

- With the relevance of the Jabour tribe in local governance positions, it is no surprise to find a clear positive positioning towards the tribal system as opposed to the formal rule of law mechanisms (which, in essence, are also likely to be ruled by Jabour members). This system is also widely used and respected by IDPs, “[*The mukhtar*] supports us all [*the IDPs*] and we don’t like to make things bigger so don’t report anything to the police. It is best to solve problems in the neighbourhood. We don’t think more intervention is needed,” (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to al-Ahad, 19 years old).
- A variety of factors were pointed out by respondents as means to improve the wellbeing of the area and make residents feel comfortable. While some mentioned the need for better services that could make people feel their needs covered, others pointed to the need of provide services and facilities to take care of the children. As in other locations, residents are forced to pay tuition for their kids due to the absence of official teachers working in the school of these two villages. A link between economic support and security was also established by two respondents, “*My recommendation is to provide services, job opportunities. If these are available, then security will improve. When I went to northern governorates, in Kirkuk and Erbil, I felt most comfortable because things there are provided and available. As soon as I came back, we felt uncomfortable again,*” (Male host community member from Samad, 45 years old).

4. CROSS-CUTTING THEMES


What follows here are themes that emerged from the interview data that are either relatively common to all target areas or are understood when comparing different narratives and intra- and inter-group interactions in the area, including based on tribal affiliation, residence status, gender, and age, among others.

4.1. BRINGING PEOPLE AND GROUPS TOGETHER

FEELINGS OF PLACE AND BELONGING

One of the ways to assess the state of social dynamics is through measuring community belonging through two variables: belonging to Iraq and belonging to the location where both host community members and IDPs interviewed currently live. Figure 2 shows the differences in the feelings of belonging across place and across population groups (it has to be noted that further disaggregation by location would not be adequate due to the small number of interviews it would include).

Figure 2. Measuring belonging to a place by population groups



Note: Respondents were given a picture of four different representations of belonging, to which they chose the one closest to their feelings. Total number of respondents is larger than the 34 interviews conducted because some interviews took place with more than a person present. For these questions, each person present was asked to respond.

From this starting point, several considerations can be taken that open the door to further discussions in the following sections:

- Belonging to Iraq as a nation is a unifying concept that remains significantly strong – as many respondents agreed, *“In spite of everything, and after only seeing war and people killed, I am still proud to be Iraqi,”* (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to al-Ahad, 19 years old). Similar results are held across population groups and gender, with the notable exception of a minority of displaced female respondents pointing to a strong feeling of victimhood and the desire to leave the country.
- Expressions of belonging to the specific villages provided a more nuanced view. Male host community members are the ones showing a higher level of belonging and identification, although not as generalised as would be expected. It is female host community respondents who provide a more diverse picture, with about half of them fully feeling like belonging to the community, but a significant portion feeling almost totally alienated from living there – low belonging responses can be found in both Qadissiya and the more rural areas.
- Finally, regarding the feelings of belonging that IDPs hold with regards to their place of refuge, the data shows that they are relatively low. There is a significant difference between male host community members and male IDP members, with these latter not feeling attached to the community: *“I do not feel integrated. I do not own anything here, no cars, no house. This pushes me to return as soon as possible,”* (Male IDP from Beiji displaced to Qadissiya, 40 years old). The case for women is significantly more worrying, with a large majority choosing the lowest feeling of belonging. As one respondent noted: *“Because we don’t belong here. We feel like strangers and most of the time people tell us we are IDPs,”* (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to Erbaidha, 47 years old).

STRAINED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOST COMMUNITY OVERALL AND HAWIJA IDPS

While in general across locations in both Tikrit and al-Alam, host community members report interactions with IDPs to be good overall, those displaced, particularly from Hawija report a very different scenario in terms of their comfort level with the host community and their feelings of being welcome:

We still seem quite overlooked by the hosts. You feel like you are on a lower level. They still mention constantly that we are displaced people and it makes you feel on a completely different level than being in your hometown . . . This makes me feel quite a stranger and not very comfortable here. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced in Erbaidha, 34 years old)

Here if I ask anything to anybody, it feels like they will get upset. Being from the same tribe does not make any change in this sense. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced in Tal al-Seebat, 30 years old)

The women in the village are very aggressive and hate IDPs and tell them to go. They want to feel better without IDPs. They talk badly about Hawija in front of us. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in Tal al-Seebat, 47 years old)

The seeming disdain for populations from Hawija comes across more so in the responses with female host community members than their male counterparts, and while subtle it is relatively clear that class and cultural differences play a strong role in integration or not, *“Most of the IDPs are careless with their children and they are always on the street. A host community member hit an IDP kid with his car because the kid was always on the street 24 hours a day,”* (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 19 years old). This is in stark contrast to the perceptions of IDPs displaced into the same areas originally from within Salahaddin Governorate:

I feel comfortable here because people treat me well here. I was in Kirkuk before but it was very bad there. The prices were doubled and no one spoke to us. But here, they treat us very well. (Female IDP from Beiji displaced in Erbaidha, 28 years old)

I am friends with the host community and have good interactions with them. They are the ones who gave me the room and we share everything together. We cook together, make dolma together. (Female IDP from Tuz Khormatu displaced in Erbaidha, 42 years old)

I participate in social activities here, funerals, but also doing things for the community like cleaning the streets. Sometimes we collect money, we hire people and we help to clean. We did the same in Beiji but more frequently because we were all more related there. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya 2, 43 years old)

Related to this last statement, many men from Hawija expressed interest in wanting to participate in civic activities as they had in their home villages and neighbourhoods, but are unable to or unsure how to approach the topic given limited interactions with the host community, *“I did participate a lot in Hawija, on cleaning and fixing things. Here, because I am not accepted, I am not doing anything. I would do it if they would invite me, to actually feel like being part of the society,”* (Male IDP from Hawija displaced in Al-Ahad, 30 years old).

REMAINING DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN OLD AND NEW HOST COMMUNITIES

The feeling of being “other” among the original host communities in Tikrit and al-Alam extends beyond the post-2014 IDPs and to those classified herein as “new hosts” – or those displaced into Tikrit and al-

Alam between 2006 and 2009, typically from Baghdad, Diyala, Nineveh, and southern parts of the country. Even those who tend to report feeling at home in these locations still classify themselves as displaced, *“The host community are all Jabour tribe. We are al-Nami from Nasriya. Most IDPs are from Hawija, Mosul, Baghdad, etc. I can’t specify where they are all from,”* (Female new host community member originally from Nasriya living in Samad since 2009, 39 years old). The recent wave of ISIS-conflict displacement, affecting all residents has changed perceptions, albeit it very slowly:

[Interactions are] very good, much better than before. Before 2014, IDPs like us used to be a different “group,” but now, with most of the host community becoming IDPs themselves, they know what it means. Feelings are good, but there is still a difference. (Male new host community member originally from Diyala living in Qadissiya since 2007, 50 years old)

That being said, new host community members expressed deep hurt and strong emotion about their over 10 years in Tikrit or al-Alam:

I really hate Tikrit as it is not my place of origin. (Female new host community member originally from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 52 years old)

[What will make me most comfortable and secure is] whatever it takes not to be called an IDP anymore. There have been attempts by people and authorities to make us feel welcome and in transferring papers here. But it upsets me that my kids are still going to be called IDPs when they grow. There are a few people here with immovable thinking about us. (Male new host community member originally from Diyala living in Samad since 2006, 30 years old)

This serves to further highlight the earlier contention that Tikrit and surroundings are difficult for outsiders, particularly from elsewhere in the country, to integrate into.

WOMEN WANT OUT

Substantial differences were noted between both host community and IDP women and their male counterparts, particularly in relation to protection concerns and ISIS, as will be discussed in subsequent sections. One striking finding raised however that is worth exploring is the relatively high rate of host community women who feel that they do not belong to their current location (see also Figure 2), for reasons that have less to do with security than a desire for changing norms:

I want to give my children a good education, healthcare. I don’t belong here. (Female host community member from Qadissiya, 26 years old)

We want to live in a more modern place in Iraq that is less tribal, more educated, and that has more freedom. (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 19 years old)

I want to move to Erbil but the community will break my reputation. I want a better line and education for my kids. I am forced to stay among community, but I want to leave this place. (Female host community member from Erbaidha, 36 years old)

Because of my education level and culture and how I was raised, I don’t belong here. I desire to belong somewhere better. I can’t find myself here. (Female host community member from al-Ahad, 25 years old)

This is opposed to IDP populations in general who did not feel belonging to their current location because they are not from these locations and new and old host community men, who by and large indicated strong bonds for the places where they currently live:

This is where I'm most secure and I have my supportive network. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 20 years old)

For here, we do have friends and we know the place. (Male new host community member from Diyala living in Qadissiya since 2007, 52 years old)

Indeed, these younger host community women seek to find societies, predominantly within Iraq, where they can have more opportunity both individually and for their children as well as the ability to, in a sense, "be themselves," more than where they currently are. The experience of seeing other places or ways of living, in some cases due to their recent displacement, has helped in shaping these views.

PAY ATTENTION TO YOUTH

Seeing how others live, either in person or via the internet has also to some extent shaped young people's views of their agency and feelings of Iraq, "*Many of the young people prefer to go out [of Iraq] because we compare ourselves to people in other countries. We see things on Facebook. We feel sorry for ourselves, but I am proud to be Iraqi,*" (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in al-Ahad, 19 years old). This juxtaposition is seen across younger respondents, all of whom claim strong identity toward being Iraqi, even if noting it is a difficult place to live.

Older respondents in Qadissiya also picked up on this, citing great concern for younger generations and the need for more attention to be paid to them by authorities and civil society alike:

I am very worried about my sons as I don't know what will happen to them. (Female new host community member from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 52 years old)

We recommend to authorities and organizations to do activities on cleaning the streets and reconstructing but, above all, please do capacity building for the youth. This generation lacks preparation. They do not have a proper understanding of life and are all the time with the focus on the phones. They do not know anything about adequate behaviour, religion, etc. They are not prepared. (Male new host community member from Diyala living in Qadissiya since 2007, 52 years old)

Youth must be taken care of, especially – we need courses, trainings. Youth are losing their time on the internet and not having any opportunity in real life. (Male new host community member from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 45 years old)

For youth, stuff about awareness in life and social capacity is required. Improve their mood, give them something to do. There is no physical space for that. (Male IDP from Beiji living in Qadissiya, 43 years old)

SPECTRE OF ALLEGED ISIS-AFFILIATED FAMILIES

This is a particularly sensitive topic across conflict-affected Iraq, and Tikrit and al-Alam are no different. While in other locations, in northern Nineveh for instance, people seemed more open to speaking about this, here language respondents were very guarded.¹⁶ Host community men tended to indicate that ISIS elements were no longer within their communities:

Now all is coming back to positive dynamics. Tensions have been solved by law – all 'those' people are imprisoned. (Male host community member in Qadissiya, 66 years old).

¹⁶ Social Inquiry, '*We Don't Want Them Back*': *Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning, and Remaining Populations in The Aftermath of ISIS in Northern Ninewa*, Social Inquiry: Erbil, 2017.

After liberation, ISIS is gone. No more threat from that. There are now no major concerns and people do go back to what used to be before. (Male host community member in Erbaidha, 20 years old)

Displaced populations and women in general were more open about the fact that ISIS members came from their own communities, though carefully distancing themselves from any connection and noting none are able to return:

In 2014, we saw [ISIS] come into our neighbourhood. No one stood against them. The neighbours all joined them. Most people cooperated with ISIS, now they regret it and try running away to Turkey, Kurdistan, elsewhere. Names are written down so they will be killed, tribally. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 70 years old)

Most of our neighbours cooperated with [ISIS]. They were wealthy and can come back again. We are not fearful of a specific thing, just ISIS. (Female IDP from Beiji displaced in Erbaidha, 28 years old)

We came back and most came back too. But some who cooperated with ISIS did not. We know some people cooperated but don't know who specifically. They couldn't return. (Female new host community member from Nasriya living in Samad since 2009, 39 years old)

Such distancing and out of sight, out of mind portrayals may, however, paint a more optimistic and simplistic picture than what is actually happening in these neighbourhoods and villages, particularly as deeper probing may further intra- and inter-tribal divisions in relation to those supporting ISIS and those fighting against the armed group. This is worth noting as a tension between the more clear-cut narratives above and more complicated ones also picked up in interviews:

I am still afraid. Many people from the neighbourhood supported ISIS and from time to time, I see strangers coming out of gardens and garages. They are clean and shaved. This is why we think people are supporting them and taking care of them. This is why we are worried ISIS may come back here. (Female host community member from al-Ahad, 25 years old)

The neighbourhood is now full of ISIS. Most of the families here stayed and joined ISIS, particularly the men. The women and children are back in the neighbourhoods. The chief of ISIS is here. It is like my husband's death is like nothing. I told the police and they took some families to the prison camp . . . It is full of ISIS families, wives and kids. The police say that we can't blame children, but these kids will grow up like their fathers. (Female host community member in Erbaidha, 36 years old)

Women in general seemed more open to speak directly about ISIS presence than men, perhaps for legitimate protection concerns given the deeper scrutiny they may face as seen as potential threats by security actors in the area. It was noted however in a couple of interviews, including with women, that when ISIS connections were raised by respondents, others present often told the speaker to be careful or not talk as much on the subject.

TRUST AND MISTRUST SINCE 2014

Related to the above, perceptions of the “post-ISIS” social fabric in these neighbourhoods and villages is mixed. Again, men tended to note that relations were better now than they had been:

Relations are better now, ISIS united us. Now we know who was ISIS and precisely these families are not here anymore. They never returned – both the individuals and families. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 41 years old)

Now relations are very good. Even better than before, I will say. ISIS united us. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 20 years old)

Relations are better now than before. (Male host community member from Qadissiya, 66 years old)

For these respondents, it seems ISIS helped in sorting out who was who in their communities. For others, again, particularly women and IDPs, ISIS caused greater confusion and suspicion among those now back:

We are careful to interaction with neighbours, not that they are bad. But my brother-in-law is worried about our reputation . . . As a result of ISIS, people are starting to feel careful around each other. Levels of trust here have dropped. You feel relationships are the same, but people don't talk about sensitive things anymore. (Female host community member from Qadessiya, 36 years old)

The levels of trust are now low. People are afraid of each other. (Female new host community member from Nasriya living in Samad since 2009, 39 years old)

No one knows who is against him, so have to be careful. It is better to keep to yourself. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 70 years old)

Such differing views and the inability of people to feel at ease discussing such issues more openly makes carrying out social cohesion and reintegration work and assessing dynamics that much murkier in the longer-term, potentially paving the way for more conflict and isolation.

4.2. Perceived threats

HOST COMMUNITY'S PROTECTION CONCERNS

The biggest social threat and protection concern for host community women across all interviews is the return or re-emergence of ISIS or similar group into their communities:

We are afraid of a new scenario. ISIS or some new form that will make us lose people again. That we will displace again. (Female host community member from Qadissiya, 60 years old)

We feel unsafe and afraid of ISIS coming back . . . We feel afraid that ISIS will come back or enter again. We don't go out after midnight, even to the toilet out of fear . . . Even after ISIS was chased out of the city, there are some cells that shoot at the town. (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 19 years old)

While women also noted concerns over other socio-economic factors within their communities, the fear of a return to violence from ISIS or another similar group was prevalent, more so than in male respondents. This fear has kept them even closer to their homes than under normal circumstances and is also connected to the loss of family members, including husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons. What women seek from authorities in particular is, *“guarantees from the government that the community will be safe and that what happened in 2014 will never happen again,”* (Female new host community member from Nasriya living in Samad since 2009, 39 years old).

Men, on the other hand, did not report specific physical protection concerns – partly in an attitude of unwillingness to openly discuss potential sources of conflict and put past fears behind them and move on, *“I don't perceive anything threatening here. I think we all feel comfortable now. The only sources of*

ension are the usual: a fight, a car accident. Despite different tribes here, no problems,” (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 34 years old). Host community men seemed more concerned with being neglected and being unable to provide for their families, as will be discussed in the coming sections. Only one respondent pointed to issues about having armed groups in charge of local security whose members are not local – and therefore not feeling protected until the checkpoints and security outposts are manned by people sourced from the district.

IDPS' PROTECTION CONCERNS

IDPs referred to threats and concerns particular to their condition of displaced families. First, there is a fear of forced returns – a fear that in some cases could be happening. Residence permits are gradually not being renewed under the grounds that the place of origin of most IDPs is already “liberated.” This feeds into wider feelings of physical insecurity for the displaced families and gives space to a diversity of fears, from concerns of authorities demanding them to leave the place, to rumours of being at risk of being kidnapped.

Our biggest social threat is being displaced people in our own country. It is a big price. We are afraid our future is totally lost and afraid someone knocking on our door and kicking us out. (Female IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 45 years old)

I don't feel very safe. We hear rumours that 'they' are kidnapping Hawija people. I feel scared that they may spread to all IDPs. We are scared and don't go out and don't interact. (Female IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 42 years old)

Second, affordability of shelter becomes an issue for IDPs as evictions are on the rise. Due to a variety of factors (landlords requesting higher rents or putting additional pressure to IDPs to return), many respondents in both urban and rural areas pointed to having already been evicted or being now looking for a new place – which, in any case, it is relatively more difficult for an IDP due to economic capacity and perceived discrimination.

The landlord is trying to kick me out – he is asking me more money every month . . . But all there in Beiji and Seiniya is destroyed now: my house, my shops, my cars... but I would like to go back, even if it means living in a couple of houses of mud... at least we would not have to pay rent! (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 40 years old)

We were living in a room belonging to a woman's market and she wanted to kick us out as she said she couldn't keep us here for free anymore. The mukhtar helped resolve this and found us a new place to live until we can go home . . . The woman wanted us to leave and said she didn't care. She said that we were ISIS and should go and starve. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in Erbaidha, 47 years old)

Finally, and linked to this latter quote, some explanations of perceived threat pointed to the risk of collective blaming, that is, either themselves or their tribe being widely accused of ISIS affiliation or, at least, sympathising with the group. As one respondent noted: *“My main threat? Oppression. In other words, I fear being accused of being a terrorist. Many people who are innocent have been detained, and the real criminals can pay a bribe and are free from jail easily,”* (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 40 years old).

The aggregation of these protection threats can end up, in the end, in premature returns, a situation that raises concerns in terms of the physical security of returnees and the potential sustainability of a peaceful

co-existence between population groups after ISIS.¹⁷ The following responses summarise this conclusion on protection concerns for IDPs:

Al-Alam authorities are not renewing the permission for IDPs from Hawija, so we are forced to go back. I cannot go back to Hawija because of Hashd – they are not allowing us back, the centre of the district is blocked. I guess I will stay in a village close to Hawija Centre until it is ok to go back. My recommendation therefore is to keep assisting IDPs until we go back – we will all go back eventually. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced in al-Ahad, 30 years old)

We also fear that our neighbours here will kick us out because our place is liberated and we are scared of this because we don't know where to go because our place of origin is not safe. ISIS existence in our place of origin is the biggest threat. Don't know what will happen, friends and relatives who returned regret it. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in Tal al-Seeb, 47 years old)

CONCERNS ABOUT NEGLECT AND BEING CAST ASIDE

Beyond physical protection issues and in terms of more “social” threats, one of the main issues regularly mentioned by male respondents is the worry of falling into a state of economic insecurity given the restricted livelihoods opportunities post-ISIS. Given the predominance in the culture of men being breadwinners, their not being able to provide for their families and in turn protect them, is a heavy burden and shame. This may explain why both host and IDP men cited their main threat as unemployment:

The economy is worse because of the instability. Life here is much more different than it used to be. I used to have a taxi and I could get enough income. But now, we only sell sweets in the street. It is difficult to provide for the family because we pay rent and we have 3 handicapped kids. (Male new host community member from Diyala living in Qadisiya since 2007, 52 years old)

With a good economic situation, it would be easier to be here and have more meaningful relations with people. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced in Erbaidha, 34 years old)

Respondents linked this situation with the concern of their communities being bypassed and neglected by authorities and other organizations in the current reconstruction efforts:

Employment is what we need. The only attempts to create employment came from the Hashd, upon liberation. Nobody else ever came . . . my main recommendation is to do whatever it takes to provide jobs. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 34 years old)

[T]he problem is mostly about development . . . unemployment is a huge concern. Farming is not productive anymore. This area, al-Alam, is not provided with job positions that the government creates – other subdistricts get more. The primary cause of tension is inequality and the consequent lack of employment. (Male host community member from Tal al-Seeb, 50 years old)

The system does not work . . . We have a feeling of neglect – those who are able to increase their material wellbeing or get high positions in government, they tend to forget about their brothers and families. (Male host community member from Duleimat, sheikh)

¹⁷ Social Inquiry, *'We Don't Want Them Back.'* In addition, premature returns are one of the key topics in which the Humanitarian Response Plan focuses in 2018.

As the last statement above notes, the fear of neglect and isolation at the individual level within the larger community is also important. Many blame this inequality and lack of communal protection to a heightened selfishness, not only among the community elite, but between neighbours as well. There is, therefore, an extended feeling that opportunities are distributed very unequally in the communities and that many are cast aside as families only look out for themselves and their direct circle of relations, since 2003:

There have been radical changes since 2003. Subtribes started fighting against each other and competing fiercely simply for material purposes. Before you could borrow as much money as you wanted from other relatives, but this became a source of problems in the last ten years. These changes put me in a worse state . . . things got to a point that people wanted to rob each other. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced to Tal al-Seebat, 30 years old)

Nothing has happened to [the other people in the community], so they never consider what others suffer or need. Every family is for itself. This is how it was before 2014 too. (Female host community member from Erbaidha, 36 years old)

The standard of living decreased significantly . . . It created a feeling that everybody was only focusing on how to provide for their family and created cleavages among the village. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 34 years old)

What we need is money to feel secure and comfortable . . . There is nothing that can be done because the people here are selfish. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to Erbaidha, 47 years old)

Things went bad all this time because of the economic gain or some. This inequality created a lack of trust. There are many undercover activities, too, going on. It creates tensions. It has a strong impact because it generates a lack of trust and everybody is working for his own interest and for nobody else. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced to Erbaidha, 34 years old)

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE AND CHANGES IN SOCIETY

As noted in previous sections, the emergence of ISIS seems to have caught so many people off guard and has changed the way people within and between groups interact and view each other. Their arrival and removal also seems to have reset people's perceptions of the trajectory of their lives, across gender, age and residence distinctions:

You constantly fear something unexpected to happen and you are constantly worried. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 43 years old)

I also feel upset thinking about the current situation and the uncertain future for my family. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in Tal al-Seebat, 47 years old)

Our fear is related to uncertainty about the future. (Female new host community member from Nasriya living in Samad since 2009, 39 years old)

It is not like before 2014, people feel scared because of an uncertain future. (Female host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 19 years old)

Instability and the fact that the situation is so unpredictable . . . we don't know what's next. (Male host community member from Samad, 45 years old)

This uncertainty may not be helped by the fact that in these more tribal areas, where everyone has experienced displacement, most are now separated from their wider families, whom they had relied on in the past as social and safety networks:

We are far from our relatives and we are concerned about who will become a new member of our family once our kids marry. (Male new host community member from Diyala living in Qadissiya since 2007, 52 years old)

We used to all live together with family and relations in big compounds. Now families are displaced all over within the territory. This has led to many divisions. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced to al-Ahad, 19 years old)

Our families and relations can't help as they are also displaced. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced to Qadissiya, 70 years old)

This shift, along with the exposure to new communities that displacement can bring, may be concerning to many, but does not seem necessarily to stymie resilience in the face of change if coupled with growing stability and the ability to feel in control of one's situation. This was noted in relation to respondents' answers to questions of when they felt most comfortable in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, many older community members noted feeling best under the previous regime, *"1989 . . . No war, no problems, and the situation in Iraq was great,"* (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 43 years old). At the same time, a number of respondents noted that they felt comfortable in the later years of the post-2003 period before 2014, when people seemed to have adjusted to their new realities and a calmer situation with a sense of normalcy:

Before 2014, it used to be so much better than now in spite of explosions, as a whole people were more comfortable. (Female host community member from al-Ahad, 25 years old)

The place where I felt most comfortable and secure was in my village between 2009 and 2014. (Male IDP from Hawija displaced to Tal al-Seeb, 51 years old)

4.3. Responsiveness (or lack thereof)

GAP WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES

Given the threats exposed in the interviews and the factors the communities would like to see to improved, respondents were also asked about the responsiveness of local authorities and their own ability to advocate for changes to meet their needs. The majority of those interviewed indicated a generalized mistrust, if not outright rejection, toward authorities, at both the provincial and local levels:¹⁸

To feel comfortable and secure, I want you to reach the government to tell them that we need a new government. There are no changes locally, just the same cycles of bad policy. Tell the government we need a new one. There is no law here, everything done by interests. The local government can't solve anything. (Female new host community member from Baghdad living in Qadissiya since 2006, 52 years old)

¹⁸ This negative view of government responsiveness in Tikrit matches with the perceptions collected in other areas of Salahaddin Governorate (Samarra and Balad) as part of an end-line assessment conducted for Mercy Corps in 2017. There, trust in the governorate's capability to respond to crises and community needs was held by slightly less than half of the population interviewed.

I don't think local authorities can help. The big boss can't do anything, how can the small guys? If central government can't help, how can local government? (Female host community member from Qadissiya, 36 years old)

A key aspect to counteract this situation is the capacity to advocate or, in other words, the existence or use of channels for communicating with the governing structures. Such channels are perceived as inexistent or, in the best case, unresponsive:

We tried to go to the education department to get some desks for the school but there they told us that they never received any request, that the message never reached them; so, unless there is someone in the government that acts for you, nobody is able to convey the message to the municipality officials. (Male host community member from Duleimat, sheikh)

There are channels to get your voice heard, but there is no response back – from the local and provincial councils to the governor. There is no response because they say they are fighting a war – that's the reason given for not increasing our general wellbeing. (Male IDP from Beiji displaced in Qadissiya, 43 years old)

It is not effective to convey this to the local authorities as they have done nothing for us before or now. (Female host community member from al-Ahad, 25 years old)

Even being member of one of the most relevant tribes in the district, such as Jabour, only gets the message to a certain point, after which the influence wanes in the absence of direct contacts, *"We have a tribal representation in the authorities, but there is no response. We asked for teachers and nobody comes. We have to pay private teachers to come to school here,"* (Male host community member from Samad, 45 years old). It is in this sense that few respondents claimed that they would like to see a public officer stepping in their village from time to time as a signal of good governance.

The main conclusion being, therefore, that institutions are worryingly absent from the people's consciousness in terms of being a mechanism to bring needed positive change to their communities.

PERCEIVED UNFAIRNESS OF AID

Awareness of the presence of local and international NGOs seems to be high among the communities, both host community members and IDPs. However, in a context of need such as post-conflict Tikrit, it is relatively common to perceive the work done as not enough or as affected by inefficiency and even corruption. For instance, host community respondents pointed out that the work of NGOs is not that visible among the community – they only see how they serve IDPs. Such perceived differential of treatment, biased as they may be, undermines cohesion in many cases: *"IDPs are a huge burden on us, they get all attention from the government and the aid – even purified water when we have none. We buy food from them sometimes. Their area is liberated, so they should go now,"* (Male host community member from Tal al-Seebat, 50 years old). The reasoning is that those families who deserve assistance, should receive it irrespective of origin.

In addition, respondents (including IDPs that had or had not received aid) expressed lack of clarity regarding who receives what and how the process works. Whether humanitarian and stabilization programs have aimed to cover everybody or have been targeted to the most vulnerable, explanations did

not reach the community members and these are therefore associating such issues with unfairness or discrimination in how aid is provided to them.¹⁹

CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS: TRIBE AND POLICE

Tribal law is the main source of local governance – the way to organise community life and solve issues. This law and authority stems from leaders of the tribe and subtribe (sometimes extending over very large territories), sheikhs, educated people, and members of families who work for the government. Across all villages in the subdistrict that were part of this research, more or less the same practices were described regarding how these communities resolve disputes and seek justice for crimes committed at the local level. This system would apply for both rural and urban environments but, as commented previously in the profile of the locations, residents in Qadissiya would refer first to the formal rule of law actors, such as police, and then include some sort of tribal arbitration.

Therefore, tribal and formal rule of law frameworks and actors generally co-exist in this area. However, the general predominance falls on the tribal system – sometimes at the expense of the formal justice system. A significant number of respondents indicated that they prefer actors like police or formal courts to be excluded from any conflict resolution due to a number of factors, including the long time they consume but also the perceived unfairness and incompetence (a factor that also links with the lack of responsiveness pointed out above).

Tribe elders from different tribes would meet to see which law or agreement to follow. Tribal solutions are fine, better than solutions that depend on law because this still needs to improve due to wasta and inefficiencies. (Male host community member from Qadissiya, 66 years old)

The mukhtar uses the tribal system as that is how we have always done it. We don't need the law. (Female IDP from Hawija displaced in al-Ahad, 19 years old)

First I would go to the tribe leaders, because the sheikh is able to solve disputes effectively. The police would not sort out things at the root of the problems and would take a long time. There are fines for every kind of incident – a fight, a small injury, would cost about 1 million dinars. (Male host community member from Erbaidha, 34 years old)

Thus it seems, particularly in the more rural areas of fieldwork there operates parallel systems of rule of law and justice, with little intersection save for very large crimes. While these tribal structures should not be overlooked as important mechanisms within the community, it may be necessary in the long run to connect formal and informal sectors more closely within these areas.

5. CHALLENGES AND PROGRAMMATIC CONSIDERATIONS

Given the above dynamics, below are some considerations that may be important for DRC to take into account when implementing early recovery programming and other longer-term development projects.

¹⁹ This is however compounded by the fact that, in many cases, respondents had very high expectations about the type of aid they can receive from humanitarian or development organizations – ranging from very specialized non-life-saving health treatments to support to leave the country.

These issues represent recommendations that can be used to maximise the positive impact and sustainability of such work to further build positive, community-led change.

- **CDCs need to serve as a link between communities and institutions, providing quick response.** Establishing a connection between CDCs and local authorities seems critical in this context in order to (re)build trust in institutions among the communities. This trust has deteriorated since 2003 and is particularly low now. Institutions and local authorities are worryingly absent from the people's minds as being a useful resort to achieve improved wellbeing. People also overwhelmingly indicate that avenues for advocacy or even being heard by authorities is limited and not effective. CDCs can play serve as a conduit for advocacy between their communities and respective local authorities in order to prevent further neglect of these communities – especially in this context when authorities are gradually stepping up their capacity back to pre-2014 levels. This advocacy can help in keeping pressure on local authorities to deliver as well as being transparent with their constituents on what is possible and why. It will be critical for local authorities as well as the CDCs to engage, act as quickly as possible, and be accountable to their communities in order to help this shift in perspective.
- **Civic-oriented activities for youth.** There is a legitimate concern for the youth in Tikrit, in particular because of years of conflict, displacement and economic downturn – concern especially present in urban areas such as Qadissiya. For this reason, it would be remiss to not work to specifically target this population group across genders and residence status not only for civic engagement and learning, but outlets for fun and recreation as well. These are two different though not mutually exclusive sets of activities that would allow young people, across groups, to have space to interact, discuss issues of importance to them, plan events or activities, and develop ways to promote positive change in their communities. This can include engagement within the CDC or presentation to the body as needed. Critical here is also space for young people to relax and enjoy themselves outside the confines of more rigid family or tribal structures and difficult life circumstances, post-ISIS.
- **Opportunities for women.** A substantial sample of the host community women within this study indicated that they would prefer to live outside of their communities, in places with more freedom and opportunity available to them. This highlights a willingness of women to more actively participate in their communities and outside of their homes, if there is an appropriate space to do so. It also provides an opportunity to begin discussions on changing gender norms within these communities. One avenue to start exploring this greater desire for agency is in providing literacy and numeracy courses to those who need it (the bulk of the women respondents in this survey had only primary education). Women also expressed interest in starting small businesses or receiving support for the work they currently do – interventions in this regard should not necessarily target the most vulnerable per se, but those who have a higher likelihood of being successful to serve as a model for others seeking similar endeavours. Beyond this, again as with youth, allowing women across groups to interact and perhaps develop platforms for their own advocacy may also help in allowing them more visible participation within community affairs. For every effort to engage women however, attention must also be paid to men in working with them to change views of gender roles as well.
- **Protection oriented programming around forced returns.** It may be positive to pay attention to protection needs of IDPs facing risk of forced or premature returns to their places of origin. With likelihood of evictions and pressure to move at such relatively high levels, referral mechanisms

within the community may be needed so that such cases can be managed through other DRC units or other partner NGOs.

- **Utilize appropriate speakers / messenger for community outreach.** Given the tight hierarchical structure of most target communities, key people within them can support the program in terms of helping generate buy-in and participation of all population groups residing in these areas. This is particularly critical as not everyone was aware of any programming taking place and many had varying views of the role of NGOs within their communities and the fairness of whatever aid has already been provided. Clear communication of what programming will take place, who can benefit, and why is necessary. Tribal leaders, imams and community members working in public institutions (e.g., doctors, teachers, etc.), are key assets for community outreach.
- **CDC as community contact point for NGOs.** In building the impartiality and functioning of the CDCs, they can start becoming a point of contact in these location and an entry point for NGOs who seek to work in these areas. This may help in minimising inefficiency and duplication in work as well as better tailoring programming to community needs.
- **Synergies with peacebuilding actors.** The data presented here indicates a number of potential ruptures in the social fabric within Tikrit: between host communities and the displaced, within host community depending on place of origin and perceived ISIS affiliation, and among those still displaced but hoping to return. These issues run deep and may be outside the scope of early recovery programming per se, but will likely need to be engaged with to ensure social cohesion programming that is conflict sensitive and inclusive. Thus, engaging with peacebuilding actors who have skill in safe facilitation and programming already working on these issues within the governorate is essential. In addition, it would be of use to connect the CDCs who are working at the very local level to emerging peacebuilding architecture, forming at the district and governorate levels in relation to issues on accountability, returns, security, and service provision to help in connecting local level concerns to wider governorate level policies and action and vice versa. These connections could help in boosting the sustainability of the CDCs, making sure community concerns are raised to the appropriate authorities.

Note: ** and *** is used to denote topics that were repeated by various respondents.

TAL AL-SEEBAT

SOCIAL THREATS

Host community

- ISIS comeback **
- Neglect
- Economic insecurity

IDPs

- Economic insecurity ***
- Eviction
- ISIS comeback

NEEDS TO FEEL COMFORTABLE

Host community

- Better security ***
- Purified water supply
- Sources of income
- Departure of IDPs

IDPs

- Financial assistance + NFIs ***
- Material improvement of life

ERBAIDHA

SOCIAL THREATS

Host community

- Elements of ISIS within community
- ISIS comeback
- Affordability of basic items
- Neglect
- None **

IDPs

- ISIS comeback ***
- Lack of trust
- Cultural change during displacement

NEEDS TO FEEL COMFORTABLE

Host community

- Invest in education provision
- Material improvement of life
- Source of income + Employment

IDPs

- Financial assistance + Cash ***
- Better institutional treatment (checkpoints, mukhtars)

QADISSIYA QUARTER

SOCIAL THREATS

Host community

- Economic insecurity ***
- Corruption
- ISIS comeback

IDPs

- Eviction ***
- Being displaced again **
- Collective blaming on IDPs

NEEDS TO FEEL COMFORTABLE

Host community

- Work on the youth ***
- Sources of income **
- General reconstruction
- Change in government

IDPs

- Housing + Reconstruction **
- Work on the youth
- Better institutional treatment (civil servants)
- NFI assistance

SAMAD + AL-AHAD

SOCIAL THREATS

Host community

- Economic insecurity ***
- Bad religious speech
- Lack of trust in community
- Wrong security actors

IDPs

- Forced return
- ISIS comeback

NEEDS TO FEEL COMFORTABLE

Host community

- Better security ***
- Sources of income ***
- Better integration of new members
- Material improvement of life

IDPs

- Reconstruction + Housing ***
- Sources of income